Case NOT closed: that 2010 verdict did not sit well with French prosecutors and lawyers for Continental Airlines. They filed an appeal which is now scheduled to be heard in March of 2012 in Versailles, near Paris. The precise grounds of appeal are not readily available at this stage, but it can be assumed that they will be publicly disclosed shortly.

   The unusual aspect of the upcoming appeal proceedings is that the appeal will involve issues of fact in addition to strict issues of law. This appeal has all the makings of a new trial. Experts will be called again to testify possibly about fresh evidence related to the crash that claimed 113 lives just short of 12 years ago.

   Another unusual aspect of the first trial and the upcoming appeal proceedings is that the joint French-British Concorde venture did not lead to charges being laid against British entities and personnel that participated in the design of the supersonic aircraft. As a matter of fact, despite similar incidents (i.e.: a blown tire on take-off) in the operation of Concorde aircraft by British Airways before the Paris crash of an Air France sister aircraft, the focus of the judicial proceedings has always been so far on French legal entities or individuals, and more so on Continental Airlines for its responsibility in the fateful dropping on the runway of a small metal strip from one of its aircraft immediately ahead of Concorde’s take-off on the same runway.

   The question that has arisen in many people’s mind is whether Continental Airlines was scape-goated during the technical investigation of the crash and the subsequent legal proceedings.

   Will the whole case be reopened in an attempt to counter allegations that there was an agreement of sorts among parties involved in the technical investigation of the crash or named in the judicial proceedings to lean one way to the detriment of Continental? 

   A number of experts still maintain that it takes more than a small strip of metal and the consenquent blow-up of a single tire to bring down an airliner in light of strict airworthiness standards and related service bulletins. Or, as others question, was it wise on the part of Concorde’s engineers to design the underside of the delta wing in a way that a strike by a piece of a blown tire on take-off could send a powerful shock wave through the fuel cells within Concorde’s wing, leading to a fuel leak that was possibly ignited by arcing electrical wires beneath the stricken supersonic? 

   It does seem as if the magnificent speed bird had a peculiar Achilles’ Heel. Technical assumptions abound about causal factors of of the crash. Rumours have been circulated to the effect that the doomed Concorde exceeded its maximum take-off weight by six tons and that it took off with a tail wind component. Who is to know for sure? Lawyers for Continental also argued in the lower court that ignited fuel started to escape from Concorde before its main landing gear overran the piece of metal dropped by the preceding Continental airliner. For the average Joe, such allegations are confusing and it’s not easy to find out how they were dealt with by the presiding judge in the lower court.

   The surprising finding by the lower court that the aircraft maintenance mechanic who installed the unsteady metal strip on the Continental jet that took-off ahead of Concorde must have forseen the catastrophic consequences of his shoddy workmanship. In fact, that point might very well be raised on appeal. (Please note that your diligent blogger here can only make an approximation about the ‘manslaughter’ or ‘negligence causing death’ charge for lack or knowledge of French law.)

   At any rate, the period from March to May of 2012 will generate much attention amongst the commercial aviation community and, to some extent, the public at large.

   Concorde was an iconic supersonic aircraft in France. Some may have turned their attention to other topics of interest over the last 12 years, while others still seek closure on the prestigious era of a French-designed marvel of an airliner, not to forget similarly concerned people on the British side.

   To what extent has French pride obscured technical and legal reasoning during the proceedings held by the lower court in Pontoise two years ago, if any connection at all? What lessons can the whole civil aviation community derive from the Paris crash and the demise of the supersonic Concorde program? We are likely to find out in 2012.

   Meanwhile, the French technical investigation authorities (known as the “BEA”) are to release their final investigation report also in the course of 2012, regarding the causes of the downing of Air France flight 447 in June of 2009, in the middle of the Atlantic ocean, also with no survivors.

   Air travellers’ confidence in the overall safety of airline transport remains strong. And it should remain strong after the final judicial outcome of the Air France Concorde crash as well as the more recent crash of the Air France Airbus 330 en route from Rio to Paris, provided the judicial outcome of both tragedies is clear, all-encompassing and entirely justified.

   On a side-note, there remains a demand for public supersonic air transport. In order to respond to such demand, a radically new generation of supersonic aircraft will need to be designed. According to aviation media, that new step in supersonic transport is not around the corner. Launching a new aircraft capable of carrying paying passengers at Mach 2 or 3 over long distances appears for now to be beyond the financial reach of aircraft manufacturers.

Criminal proceedings into the deadly Concorde crash opened in early 2010, more than 10 years after the event. The resulting trial judgment issued on December 6, 2010, which laid criminal liability on one Continental Airlines mechanic and consequently on his employer, is doubtful. In fact, most of the defendants, as well as the prosecution, are appealing the ruling. What possibly went wrong – not in the crash itself – but in the court’s decision that has lead most of the parties on both sides of the case to file an appeal?      

   July 2000. An Air France Concorde supersonic airliner crashes north of Paris Charles de Gaulle airport shortly after take-off, killing all on board in addition to three persons on the ground, for a total of 113 casualties, not to mention post-traumatic stress disorders that witnesses at the scene are still experiencing.     

   Early 2010: a French court in Pontoise (north of Paris) initiates hearings in search of possible criminal liability involved in the major air crash.     

   December 6, 2010: The Pontoise court issues a judgment holding an American aircraft mechanic and his employer, Continental Airlines, directly responsible for the Concorde crash (one of Continental’s DC-10s dropped a metal strip on the runway just before Concorde’s take-off on the same runway.)  Other defendants, such as Air France and the top manager in charge of the Concorde development program are acquitted because their actions in terms of continuing airworthiness are assessed as merely neglectful.     

   Air France, even though acquitted at trial, files an appeal requesting that it also be involved in the appeal process in order to clear its name after the damaging submissions made against it by Continental Airlines’ defense lawyer. This move is perceived as an attempt by Air France to restore its good reputation as a major airline.  Meanwhile, the Air France Rio-to-Paris Airbus crash trial is coming up soon. A lot of questions will need to be answered there too. Air France is likely wanting this other trial to start from a clean slate, with no negative inferences about its reputation arising from the Concorde trial.     

   On December 21, we learn of a new twist in the Concorde case that could also defeat the trial judgment: the State prosecution in Pontoise is appealing the acquittal of other defendants in the case, namely the top manager in charge of the Concorde program and another similarly important executive in charge of Concorde’s continuing airworthiness.     

   This looks like a typical case of back to square one, more than 10 years after the sad loss of innocent lives in the crash.     

   Arguments against the judgment issued by the trial judge on December 6, 2010, may be summarily stated as follows:     

1) causation and foreseeability of crash: there is no valid reason to pin direct liability on a Continental Airlines’ maintenance engineer for having improperly affixed a metal strip to the Continental DC-10 that took off ahead of Concorde, leading one of Concorde’s tires to blow apart with debris puncturing the underside of the wing, thereby causing the unforeseeable wing tank fire that brought Concorde down to a fiery and deadly crash two minutes after take-off;     

2) willful blindness: Air France and Aérospatiale’s (now EADS) top Concorde program managers were acquitted too easily, when evidence points to possible willful blindness about known design weaknesses of Concorde and repeated take-off incidents due to blown tires prior to the crash. How can such a gorgeous looking airliner have any faults, one might ask. Think again. Several observers have wondered whether national prestige may have played a role in shielding Concorde from impartial scrutiny in technical issues plaguing the government-backed French supersonic transport program. If that were the case, can a French trial judge make such a finding even if it entails lifting the political veil?     

3) knowingly exposing a third party to the risk of an accident resulting in known disastrous consequences («faute caractérisée»): according to legal commentators, the trial judge may have wrongly applied the recent statutory concept in French criminal law of «faute caractérisée», to the conduct of the Continental Airlines mechanic. This concept has no statutory definition; it is still in the process of being clarified by the French courts. And yet, it is a key concept upon which the Continental Airlines mechanic was held responsible for the crash.

   Lesson learned again: major airline disasters cannot be fully dealt with through ordinary criminal proceedings. A special public inquiry would have been preferable, assuming French law provides for such a venue. Too many technical elements are at stake in major aviation accidents. The sheer magnitude of non-natural disasters of public interest stands as an obstacle for ordinary criminal courts to rule on them meaningfully, no matter how many technical experts take the stand in support of and against the charges, or even as amici curiae (neutral advisors to the court.) The drawback with public inquiries is that they are in many cases limited to making specific findings not involving liability at all and to drafting recommendations for air safety improvements. Public inquiries get a lot of public attention, which is in the public interest of course. However, once their recommendations are issued, they are not necessarily binding and it is up to the concerned public authorities to act and follow up on them. Because of such limitations, the actual outcome of public inquiries is often uncertain.     

   Let’s make it clear again: though it is virtually impossible to put a dollar figure on the loss of a human life, relatives of persons who died in or as a result of the Concorde crash have been adequately compensated for years ago. One can only hope that the same relatives have had some degree of closure, keeping in mind that ultimate closure and solace reside in knowing that such horrendous and preventable crashes never happen again.      

   Criminal proceedings were initiated years after the fiery post-takeoff crash of the French airliner at Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Airport, just north of Paris. The technical accident investigation had to run its course first. It was late in releasing its findings about the contributing causes of the highly publicised accident.

   The legal liability saga started when 113 persons, a few of them on the ground, lost their lives soon after fire erupted under the left wing of Concorde during take-off, causing the prestigious supersonic airliner, which was carrying mainly German tourists on a charter flight to North America, to crash 2 minutes after take-off.

   Seconds after clearing Concorde for take-off, the tower controller saw flames streaming from the aircraft during the take-off run and immediately radioed the problem to Concorde’s captain. Unfortunately, the aircraft had already reached near take-off speed and Captain Marty, a pilot with unimpeachable flying credentials, decided quickly that it was safer to proceed with the take-off and then make an emergency landing at Le Bourget airport a few miles away. His decision was based, of course, on what he and his cockpit crew members knew about Concorde’s condition at the time. In their minds, aborting take-off at high speed with insufficient runway length to bring the fully loaded aircraft to a safe stop was not an option.

   Concorde never made it to Le Bourget. Both engines underneath the left wing lost power gradually after fire broke out, making the aircraft roll slowly to the left and crash out-of-control in a ball of fire on a hotel property located 2 miles away from the runway.

   What happened next is sad history for relatives and friends of the victims. Most of them were compensated all right, but the lingering doubt as to who was to blame for the awful mess remained unsolved. This was perhaps the hardest part for them to accept.

   Now, more than ten years after the tragic loss of their loved ones, they might find out which person or persons, including corporate entities, are to be held criminally liable for the events leading to the crash, and why. Knowing ‘why’ is most important in that it will bring some comfort in knowing that such aviation accidents will never be allowed to happen again.

   The long-awaited answer is expected to be handed down on Monday December 6, 2010, in the Justice buildings of Pontoise, north of Paris.

   One can only hope the decision will bring final closure to those who need it 10 years after the fact and that it will also clarify the hinge-points of responsibility for those involved in the Concorde programme from its early start until the July 2000 crash, including a Continental Airline aircraft maintenance engineer who had nothing to do with Concorde’s operations. According to French prosecutors, he, his supervisor and his employer precipitated events underlying Concorde’s crash due to negligence.

   Much attention will be focused on the decision when it is issued. It could take a day or two for reporters and the more cautious legal commentators to fully explain the four corners of the judgment.

   One might seriously question the wisdom of having criminal proceedings take place after a technical investigation. The media is likely to raise issues of dysfunctionality and duplication of strained public resources in this regard. After all, ten years is a long time to pinpoint the technical and criminal causes of a major aviation accident, especially as the European Union is moving towards streamlining investigations and inquiries into accidents and incidents concerning the safety of public transportation.

THE CASE OF THE CONCORDE CRASH IN JULY  2000, AT ROISSY AIRPORT, PARIS.

   Ah, the wonderful world of aviation together with a volcano eruption in Iceland have me delayed in Europe and unable to provide a proper follow-up on the Concorde crash proceedings in Pontoise (Paris) or any other interesting aviation matters!

   The one point worth sharing on this blog, for now at any rate, is a recent comment made to me by a Belgian lawyer who regularly represents clients in the U.S. and has a broader perspective on the present Concorde trial near Paris, as a result of dealing with the Civil Law system and the American Law system.

   It would seem that if the crash of Concorde had occurred in the U.S. for instance, most, if not all, issues surrounding the crash, whether civil or criminal in nature, would have been settled out-of-court or dealt with through plea-bargaining, or possibly also through a judicial inquiry with recommendation powers only. Although current criminal proceedings in Pontoise seem tedious, the same lawyer stated that Justice would not have been publicly visible without them, contrary to out-of-court settlement and plea-bargaining processes that typically do not result in full public disclosure and debate.

   Well, food for thought…So far, I was inclined to think the current criminal proceedings were not suitable for an aviation crash of such magnitude and in light of the irreparable damage to supersonic transport known so far.

   As a side-comment, I was struck in the last month by the number of references in public media to the so-called Concorde trial. Concorde is not on trial, of course; it is just a way of expressing the significance of the crash that brought a legend to a sudden stop. The trial is aimed more specifically at key figures involved in the French/British Concorde project since 1960.  It is open to debate whether or not the right figures were picked out by judicial authorities on the French side of the joint Concorde project and why the U.K. was left out.

   It was stated in a previous posting on this blog that the Concorde program was prestige-driven. This was certainly a major factor, to the point where major decisions about the continuation of the Concorde program were admittedly taken at a political level. Whether this situation had any impact on the necessary airworthiness upgrades for Concorde remains to be seen.

   In fact, he Concorde program was not entirely prestige-driven. Up to the early 1990s, there was still hope that the program might keep the U.K. and France at the forefront of knowledge and experience in SST technology while, across the Atlantic, their Americans counterparts were pursuing the same objective. More precisely, a second generation Concorde was unofficially in the offing. In addition, the words “prestige-driven” do not necessarily apply to the pragmatic desire for passengers to fly at twice the speed of sound, provided they could afford it. However, such words do capture the ‘magic’ of supersonic flight for some passengers and public figures, and also the need to maintain the public image of France and the U.K. as leading countries in aeronautical technology.

   Are such considerations material to the current Concorde trial in Pontoise? I submit they are, as these factual elements point to the highest political levels in matters concerning large expenditures of public funds to finance the upkeep and perceived safety requirements of Concorde, on the French side of the channel anyway. This was, in my opinion, the overall framework of the Concorde program until disaster struck quite unfortunately for 113 innocent lives, not counting the number of affected relatives and friends, and witnesses at the crash scene.

   Had there been no public criminal proceedings or other transparent venues related to the crash of Concorde in July 2000, how could have the aviation community, concerned airline passengers and interested members of the public  become aware that Concorde was a unique transport aircraft to the point of being certified under a separate set of rules, and operated under separate continuing airworthiness rules as well, quite apart from those applicable to popular subsonic airliners? This question begs another: is the safety level of an airliner dependent on its pedigree? Concorde had no pedigree, except perhaps for the application of military supersonic technology and experience to a much larger an demanding civilian aircraft.* Furthermore, few units of Concorde were built and operated. The result is that Concorde was operated for decades as a public transport aircraft, with limited engineering and technical feedback derived from operational experience. Both British Airways and Air France made the best of such limited feedback. That much we know, to their credit.

   With respect, however, as dedicated, knowledgeable and safety-minded the designers, engineers, manufacturers and operators of Concorde aircraft were in their times, the whole Anglo-French SST program was conducted in some sort of vacuum. In fact, Concorde kept on transporting paying passengers for decades with patchwork engineering solutions being applied from one “incident” to the next until the “accident” occurred. Furthermore, concerned civil authorities and Concorde programme managers had not set, as far as we can tell,  a gradual retirement plan for Concorde, despite its increasingly obsolete technology.  As a matter of fact, much of the current Pontoise proceedings hinge upon the issue of foreseeability of a catastrophic failure of Concorde, such as the crash that occurred near Paris in July 2000.

   Which way was the Concorde programme heading just before one of its units crashed near Paris? This is one question that should be answered in the context of the current criminal responsibility hearings in Pontoise (France). The lone judge presiding over the hearings is expected to issue publicly her findings and decision in December 2010.

   In fairness, she might also put Concorde’s 27 years of accident-free commercial operations in the balance. After all, the civil aviation community will be looking at the important outcome of a very public – yet belated – trial of civil aviation past and modern practices.

*PS:  Concorde’s limited lineage or pedigree, as a public transport aircraft, will be addressed in a posting to follow.

   The greatness of Concorde lies not only in the amount of engineering, flight testing, lobbying for acceptance in foreign countries, and money allocated to the supersonic transport jet mega-project, but also in the purity and elegance of its profile, lines and curvatures together with graceful manoeuvres on take-off and landing, and overall sheer good looks (decibels quite apart, I admit). Moreover, Concorde  kicked off a passionate debate in the far recesses of my own mind: did she look sleek by design or as a result of  her suitability as an airliner in both a subsonic climb to altitude and approach to land environment on the one hand, and a supersonic cruising environment on the other?

   Imagine the engineering ingenuity  that went into designing a flap-less delta-wing supersonic airliner fit for existing airports. The end result was an aircraft both so streamlined and functional that body-style designers, such as Ferrari, perhaps could not have dreamed of for any vehicle. At high levels of attack on take-off and landing with her drooped nose, she maintained a graceful look, something straight out of an artist’s imagination.

   Most people did not realise also how much engineering know-how had to be applied in order for Concorde to stretch and contract in length as her skin went from low temperatures to high temperatures generated  by Mach 2.2 cruise flight on her wings and fuselage. A civil aviation marvel she was indeed.

   By hubris or not, the magnitude of the Concorde project which, some say, helped usher France and the U.K. into the European Union, reflects the hopes and aspirations of a whole generation. Continents would be linked in less than half the time it takes for subsonic jets to fly the same intercontinental routes.

   The frailty of Concorde can be found in her anachronism. Her splendour was obvious; however, she was born out of older technology, a problem that a number of reputable aeroplanes, such as the DC-3 and the Boeing 707, to name but a few, shared with Concorde, albeit with fewer news coverage of dramatic and fatal signs of aging.

   This airliner was the subject of much attention by both pro-Concorde and anti-Concorde interest groups. A compromise agreement was struck: Concorde would be allowed to overfly populated areas at subsonic speeds only.

   Why would dual flag-carrying airliners such as Concorde be allowed to operate amongst slower jetliners built to recent, more stringent and more efficient aeronautical and environmental standards? Oh yes, I hear: “She was grandfathered in.” If so, should public authorities keep on protecting, from a regulatory perspective, a beautiful aeronautical product from a recent past at the cost of putting lives at risk until other circumstances brought its commercial use to an end?

   How many people would nowadays go for a ride in a hot air balloon built in all respects like the original Montgolfier brother’s (presumably) successful model?

   France and the U.K. had every reason to be jointly proud of Concorde. The problem is neither country knew when to confine the aging supersonic airliner to a museum before disaster struck. Did the the Concorde program change to a prestige-driven venture only? This was likely the case since a number of jet aircraft of an older vintage and no longer allowed to carry paying passengers are still allowed to carry freight. Unfortunately, Concorde did not have a  fall-back commercial niche; flying the Jet Set at premium airfares was its only remaining one.

   When Concorde crashed after her fateful take-off from Roissy, she was technologically decades behind her times by several standards, even if she could cruise twice as fast as modern subsonic  jetliners.

   On a more positive note, Concorde was the first commercial airliner to incorporate sophisticated fly-by-wire technology, a major engineering feat  in the 1960s. Her quadruple Olympus power plant was amongst the most reliable at the time. Unfortunately, Concorde’s complex design made it difficult to incorporate later on engines that were more fuel-efficient, less noisy and more resistant to FOD. 

   The Concorde disaster in Paris has a positive fall-out: the growing opinion that high-speed intercontinental travel should perhaps be carried out above the atmosphere, i.e. with suborbital spacecraft. This approach is supported in part by the major airlines’ reluctance, in today’s economic context, to place orders for new supersonic transport aircraft operated at higher operating costs on a per seat per mile basis. 

   The short to medium solution now being considered and tested is not an improved existing SST concept, but a totally different one: a suborbital spacecraft such as the Virgin Galactic SpaceshipTwo recently unveiled by Virgin Air’s CEO, Sir Richard Branson and by Dick Rutan, a well-known pioneering  expert in composite materials applied to innovative aircraft designs.

  NASA is wise in phasing-out the current space shuttles. In fact, the U.S. space agency had set a life expectancy for its fleet of space shuttles.

   Were the U.K. and France in the process of acting likewise for Concorde when the Paris crash occurred? Civil aviation authorities in both countries may have set a time limit only as a result of Concorde’s unfortunate crash in Paris.

   Having said this, the future looks promising for supersonic intercontinental travel using suborbital trajectories with whatever vehicles will foot the bill in terms of commercial feasibility. For now, suborbital transportation remains far in the offing. Spaceflight bookings confidently accepted at present by Virgin Galactic will no doubt offer space tourists a sensational experience, keeping in mind however their amazing spacecraft will land where it took off from. 

Happy New Year!

   PS: With the underside of their delta wing strengthened after the deadly crash of a Concorde shortly after take-off from Paris-CDG airport in 2000, other Concorde units resumed commercial transatlantic flights under the Air France and British Airways banners. All Concorde units were finally retired in 2003, owing to excessive operating costs to both airlines. Concorde had flown commercially for nearly 30 years with no reported casualties until the most unfortunate Paris crash.  See Wikipedia for further details about the history of Concorde.