Case NOT closed: that 2010 verdict did not sit well with French prosecutors and lawyers for Continental Airlines. They filed an appeal which is now scheduled to be heard in March of 2012 in Versailles, near Paris. The precise grounds of appeal are not readily available at this stage, but it can be assumed that they will be publicly disclosed shortly.

   The unusual aspect of the upcoming appeal proceedings is that the appeal will involve issues of fact in addition to strict issues of law. This appeal has all the makings of a new trial. Experts will be called again to testify possibly about fresh evidence related to the crash that claimed 113 lives just short of 12 years ago.

   Another unusual aspect of the first trial and the upcoming appeal proceedings is that the joint French-British Concorde venture did not lead to charges being laid against British entities and personnel that participated in the design of the supersonic aircraft. As a matter of fact, despite similar incidents (i.e.: a blown tire on take-off) in the operation of Concorde aircraft by British Airways before the Paris crash of an Air France sister aircraft, the focus of the judicial proceedings has always been so far on French legal entities or individuals, and more so on Continental Airlines for its responsibility in the fateful dropping on the runway of a small metal strip from one of its aircraft immediately ahead of Concorde’s take-off on the same runway.

   The question that has arisen in many people’s mind is whether Continental Airlines was scape-goated during the technical investigation of the crash and the subsequent legal proceedings.

   Will the whole case be reopened in an attempt to counter allegations that there was an agreement of sorts among parties involved in the technical investigation of the crash or named in the judicial proceedings to lean one way to the detriment of Continental? 

   A number of experts still maintain that it takes more than a small strip of metal and the consenquent blow-up of a single tire to bring down an airliner in light of strict airworthiness standards and related service bulletins. Or, as others question, was it wise on the part of Concorde’s engineers to design the underside of the delta wing in a way that a strike by a piece of a blown tire on take-off could send a powerful shock wave through the fuel cells within Concorde’s wing, leading to a fuel leak that was possibly ignited by arcing electrical wires beneath the stricken supersonic? 

   It does seem as if the magnificent speed bird had a peculiar Achilles’ Heel. Technical assumptions abound about causal factors of of the crash. Rumours have been circulated to the effect that the doomed Concorde exceeded its maximum take-off weight by six tons and that it took off with a tail wind component. Who is to know for sure? Lawyers for Continental also argued in the lower court that ignited fuel started to escape from Concorde before its main landing gear overran the piece of metal dropped by the preceding Continental airliner. For the average Joe, such allegations are confusing and it’s not easy to find out how they were dealt with by the presiding judge in the lower court.

   The surprising finding by the lower court that the aircraft maintenance mechanic who installed the unsteady metal strip on the Continental jet that took-off ahead of Concorde must have forseen the catastrophic consequences of his shoddy workmanship. In fact, that point might very well be raised on appeal. (Please note that your diligent blogger here can only make an approximation about the ‘manslaughter’ or ‘negligence causing death’ charge for lack or knowledge of French law.)

   At any rate, the period from March to May of 2012 will generate much attention amongst the commercial aviation community and, to some extent, the public at large.

   Concorde was an iconic supersonic aircraft in France. Some may have turned their attention to other topics of interest over the last 12 years, while others still seek closure on the prestigious era of a French-designed marvel of an airliner, not to forget similarly concerned people on the British side.

   To what extent has French pride obscured technical and legal reasoning during the proceedings held by the lower court in Pontoise two years ago, if any connection at all? What lessons can the whole civil aviation community derive from the Paris crash and the demise of the supersonic Concorde program? We are likely to find out in 2012.

   Meanwhile, the French technical investigation authorities (known as the “BEA”) are to release their final investigation report also in the course of 2012, regarding the causes of the downing of Air France flight 447 in June of 2009, in the middle of the Atlantic ocean, also with no survivors.

   Air travellers’ confidence in the overall safety of airline transport remains strong. And it should remain strong after the final judicial outcome of the Air France Concorde crash as well as the more recent crash of the Air France Airbus 330 en route from Rio to Paris, provided the judicial outcome of both tragedies is clear, all-encompassing and entirely justified.

   On a side-note, there remains a demand for public supersonic air transport. In order to respond to such demand, a radically new generation of supersonic aircraft will need to be designed. According to aviation media, that new step in supersonic transport is not around the corner. Launching a new aircraft capable of carrying paying passengers at Mach 2 or 3 over long distances appears for now to be beyond the financial reach of aircraft manufacturers.

   Criminal proceedings were initiated years after the fiery post-takeoff crash of the French airliner at Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Airport, just north of Paris. The technical accident investigation had to run its course first. It was late in releasing its findings about the contributing causes of the highly publicised accident.

   The legal liability saga started when 113 persons, a few of them on the ground, lost their lives soon after fire erupted under the left wing of Concorde during take-off, causing the prestigious supersonic airliner, which was carrying mainly German tourists on a charter flight to North America, to crash 2 minutes after take-off.

   Seconds after clearing Concorde for take-off, the tower controller saw flames streaming from the aircraft during the take-off run and immediately radioed the problem to Concorde’s captain. Unfortunately, the aircraft had already reached near take-off speed and Captain Marty, a pilot with unimpeachable flying credentials, decided quickly that it was safer to proceed with the take-off and then make an emergency landing at Le Bourget airport a few miles away. His decision was based, of course, on what he and his cockpit crew members knew about Concorde’s condition at the time. In their minds, aborting take-off at high speed with insufficient runway length to bring the fully loaded aircraft to a safe stop was not an option.

   Concorde never made it to Le Bourget. Both engines underneath the left wing lost power gradually after fire broke out, making the aircraft roll slowly to the left and crash out-of-control in a ball of fire on a hotel property located 2 miles away from the runway.

   What happened next is sad history for relatives and friends of the victims. Most of them were compensated all right, but the lingering doubt as to who was to blame for the awful mess remained unsolved. This was perhaps the hardest part for them to accept.

   Now, more than ten years after the tragic loss of their loved ones, they might find out which person or persons, including corporate entities, are to be held criminally liable for the events leading to the crash, and why. Knowing ‘why’ is most important in that it will bring some comfort in knowing that such aviation accidents will never be allowed to happen again.

   The long-awaited answer is expected to be handed down on Monday December 6, 2010, in the Justice buildings of Pontoise, north of Paris.

   One can only hope the decision will bring final closure to those who need it 10 years after the fact and that it will also clarify the hinge-points of responsibility for those involved in the Concorde programme from its early start until the July 2000 crash, including a Continental Airline aircraft maintenance engineer who had nothing to do with Concorde’s operations. According to French prosecutors, he, his supervisor and his employer precipitated events underlying Concorde’s crash due to negligence.

   Much attention will be focused on the decision when it is issued. It could take a day or two for reporters and the more cautious legal commentators to fully explain the four corners of the judgment.

   One might seriously question the wisdom of having criminal proceedings take place after a technical investigation. The media is likely to raise issues of dysfunctionality and duplication of strained public resources in this regard. After all, ten years is a long time to pinpoint the technical and criminal causes of a major aviation accident, especially as the European Union is moving towards streamlining investigations and inquiries into accidents and incidents concerning the safety of public transportation.

   The greatness of Concorde lies not only in the amount of engineering, flight testing, lobbying for acceptance in foreign countries, and money allocated to the supersonic transport jet mega-project, but also in the purity and elegance of its profile, lines and curvatures together with graceful manoeuvres on take-off and landing, and overall sheer good looks (decibels quite apart, I admit). Moreover, Concorde  kicked off a passionate debate in the far recesses of my own mind: did she look sleek by design or as a result of  her suitability as an airliner in both a subsonic climb to altitude and approach to land environment on the one hand, and a supersonic cruising environment on the other?

   Imagine the engineering ingenuity  that went into designing a flap-less delta-wing supersonic airliner fit for existing airports. The end result was an aircraft both so streamlined and functional that body-style designers, such as Ferrari, perhaps could not have dreamed of for any vehicle. At high levels of attack on take-off and landing with her drooped nose, she maintained a graceful look, something straight out of an artist’s imagination.

   Most people did not realise also how much engineering know-how had to be applied in order for Concorde to stretch and contract in length as her skin went from low temperatures to high temperatures generated  by Mach 2.2 cruise flight on her wings and fuselage. A civil aviation marvel she was indeed.

   By hubris or not, the magnitude of the Concorde project which, some say, helped usher France and the U.K. into the European Union, reflects the hopes and aspirations of a whole generation. Continents would be linked in less than half the time it takes for subsonic jets to fly the same intercontinental routes.

   The frailty of Concorde can be found in her anachronism. Her splendour was obvious; however, she was born out of older technology, a problem that a number of reputable aeroplanes, such as the DC-3 and the Boeing 707, to name but a few, shared with Concorde, albeit with fewer news coverage of dramatic and fatal signs of aging.

   This airliner was the subject of much attention by both pro-Concorde and anti-Concorde interest groups. A compromise agreement was struck: Concorde would be allowed to overfly populated areas at subsonic speeds only.

   Why would dual flag-carrying airliners such as Concorde be allowed to operate amongst slower jetliners built to recent, more stringent and more efficient aeronautical and environmental standards? Oh yes, I hear: “She was grandfathered in.” If so, should public authorities keep on protecting, from a regulatory perspective, a beautiful aeronautical product from a recent past at the cost of putting lives at risk until other circumstances brought its commercial use to an end?

   How many people would nowadays go for a ride in a hot air balloon built in all respects like the original Montgolfier brother’s (presumably) successful model?

   France and the U.K. had every reason to be jointly proud of Concorde. The problem is neither country knew when to confine the aging supersonic airliner to a museum before disaster struck. Did the the Concorde program change to a prestige-driven venture only? This was likely the case since a number of jet aircraft of an older vintage and no longer allowed to carry paying passengers are still allowed to carry freight. Unfortunately, Concorde did not have a  fall-back commercial niche; flying the Jet Set at premium airfares was its only remaining one.

   When Concorde crashed after her fateful take-off from Roissy, she was technologically decades behind her times by several standards, even if she could cruise twice as fast as modern subsonic  jetliners.

   On a more positive note, Concorde was the first commercial airliner to incorporate sophisticated fly-by-wire technology, a major engineering feat  in the 1960s. Her quadruple Olympus power plant was amongst the most reliable at the time. Unfortunately, Concorde’s complex design made it difficult to incorporate later on engines that were more fuel-efficient, less noisy and more resistant to FOD. 

   The Concorde disaster in Paris has a positive fall-out: the growing opinion that high-speed intercontinental travel should perhaps be carried out above the atmosphere, i.e. with suborbital spacecraft. This approach is supported in part by the major airlines’ reluctance, in today’s economic context, to place orders for new supersonic transport aircraft operated at higher operating costs on a per seat per mile basis. 

   The short to medium solution now being considered and tested is not an improved existing SST concept, but a totally different one: a suborbital spacecraft such as the Virgin Galactic SpaceshipTwo recently unveiled by Virgin Air’s CEO, Sir Richard Branson and by Dick Rutan, a well-known pioneering  expert in composite materials applied to innovative aircraft designs.

  NASA is wise in phasing-out the current space shuttles. In fact, the U.S. space agency had set a life expectancy for its fleet of space shuttles.

   Were the U.K. and France in the process of acting likewise for Concorde when the Paris crash occurred? Civil aviation authorities in both countries may have set a time limit only as a result of Concorde’s unfortunate crash in Paris.

   Having said this, the future looks promising for supersonic intercontinental travel using suborbital trajectories with whatever vehicles will foot the bill in terms of commercial feasibility. For now, suborbital transportation remains far in the offing. Spaceflight bookings confidently accepted at present by Virgin Galactic will no doubt offer space tourists a sensational experience, keeping in mind however their amazing spacecraft will land where it took off from. 

Happy New Year!

   PS: With the underside of their delta wing strengthened after the deadly crash of a Concorde shortly after take-off from Paris-CDG airport in 2000, other Concorde units resumed commercial transatlantic flights under the Air France and British Airways banners. All Concorde units were finally retired in 2003, owing to excessive operating costs to both airlines. Concorde had flown commercially for nearly 30 years with no reported casualties until the most unfortunate Paris crash.  See Wikipedia for further details about the history of Concorde.