Rio to Paris AF447 tragedy: black boxes retrieved and readable. What next?

Posted on May 18, 2011 by Steve

Aircraft black boxes are orange

   The Cockpit Voice Recorder and the Flight Data recorder, a.k.a: “the black boxes” (so called despite their orange colour) have been recovered nearly two years after Air France flight AF447 from Rio to Paris went down for unknown reasons in the Equatorial Zone, an area of the globe known for extreme weather.  However, the downed airliner, an Airbus A330 has a good reputation and, together with its well trained crew, it should have flown routinely through that zone on the way to Paris, at normal cruising altitude.

   It didn’t. What went wrong? Where are we now in terms of filling in the blanks thanks to the data contained in the black boxes?

  Days have gone by while the black boxes are being examined in the laboratory setting of the ‘Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses’ (BEA), a French accident investigation body, well equipped for the job.

   What has transpired since the box were opened in the BEA’s labs a week ago?  Zilch, except for the good news that the recorded pre-crash cockpit conversation and flight data are totally readable, despite a two-year stay under water at a depth of about 13,000 feet. An excellent outcome for the investigation of an aviation tragedy that seemed at times unexplainable. What is going on now at the BEA with the black boxes is a secret only a very small elite knows about.

   What visible action has been taken since the black boxes underwent decoding and serious technical scrutiny by the BEA?  Here is what we now know for now: French news sources report that reassuring telex messages have been sent to operators of Airbus 330 to the effect that no immediate action is required, based on preliminary data obtained from the doomed Airbus 330′s black boxes.  Such a reassuring and hasty statement can mean two things: 1) whatever corrective action might be required can wait, and 2) the preceding statement is based on preliminary data. Confusing statement if anything. The world can turn upside down in the meanwhile and the reassuring statement from Airbus Industries would still remain suitably vague and appropriate.

   Behind the scenes, though, criminal proceedings against potential culprits in the AF447 have started. Some sources report that, while judicial proceedings are underway, the contents of the perfectly readable black boxes’ recording cannot yet be released. What’s this new legal impediment to public disclosure of the black boxes?

   Another alleged reason supporting the non-disclosure of the contents of the black boxes to everyone concerned with the AF447 disaster is that the BEA must first ascertain having interpreted and analyzed the recordings in a way that will lead to accurate findings, findings that will actually identify the causes and culprits directly and indirectly involved in the AF447 crash. Culprits, or causes in a long chain of contributing factors, no doubt.

   “Identify culprits”, “Lay blame”… These are just media lines. Useless jargon, except for legal beagles.  First and foremost, relatives of victims, operators of the same type of aircraft, manufacturers of the aircraft and of its components should not have to wait, in order to take necessary safety action, for any blame to be technically ascribed to any entities, individual or corporate. They need to know NOW how to act, on the side of caution, of course, more than two years after the agonizing event.

   France’s major airline pilots’ union is incensed at the recent turn of events in which the aircraft manufacturer was prompt to issue the vague statement referred to above, one that was sent a number of times to all operators of the Airbus 330 type of aircraft. The union feels that the pilots of the doomed Airbus A330 are being unjustly finger-pointed in the absence of any serious signs of aircraft malfunction detected so far.

   This is happening against a backdrop of concerned parties patiently waiting for 1) the in-depth and almost irrefutable findings by the BEA,  2) the findings that might not be made public until the technical report in its entirety is filed with the judicial authorities involved in uncovering possible human criminal error or neglect leading up to the crash. Let us pause here, for a moment, to remember how it took the Concorde case 10 years to reach the criminal liability hearings stage in Pontoise, north of Paris. Closure after an aviation accident cannot wait that long anymore. Justice delayed is Justice denied. In the case of AF447, the contents of the black boxes’ recordings might not be disclosed before July or so. A few more weeks to go! Suspense is running high and so are tensions among major stakeholders in the crash.

   Let us keep in mind however that the recovery of the black boxes, two years after the crash, at a depth of around 4,000 metres below sea level (about 13,000 feet deep) is in itself a feat and a gesture of due diligence and best efforts on the part of Air France and Airbus Industries (EADS). The upcoming days hold a few surprises, including – why not? – the full public release of the decoded contents of the black boxes against all technical, legal and judicial odds. For the record, let it be known that France’s administrative and judicial processes tend to be burdensome and lengthy, ‘rigueur intellectuelle oblige’, although major systemic reforms are reportedly under way. This is not new nor limited to France. “La sécurité aérienne, c’est moi” Louis XIV would have said, had he been alive today.

   So far, it would seem that the parties mostly concerned, such as relatives of the AF447 victims, might require a little more patience.

   Why?  Why in a French jurisdiction? Why is the American NTSB more proactive in getting concerned parties in on the action as opposed to the French way of putting on the breaks before the public release of any significant info?

   Why does the BEA have to be so concerned about impeccable and time-consuming analysis of the back boxes in order to pinpoint blame on some entities for the sad fate of flight AF447, subject to judicial consideration by the French judicial system?

   In the best of worlds, it seems that the sooner the European Union manages to implement uniform standards across member countries for the purpose of investigating public transportation accidents, the better. In that respect, France might in fact be lagging behind the NTSB, its Canadian counter-part and other proactive civil aviation authorities, in revealing promptly the hard facts as to what happened in any transportation accident of the magnitude of AF447′s deadly splash down from cruise flight. Cruising flight it was indeed, not taking off nor landing, but in that very stage of flight where accident statistics are lowest.

   What happened to flight AF447 up there, dodging documented weather disturbances? We are still clueless after months and years of beating up the A-330′s Pitot tubes with a thousand accusatory sticks, until the last few days after the perfectly readable black boxes were finally been recovered from the abyss of the Atlantic ocean. Pitot Tubes may have been a causal factor; however, Airbus maintains that no immediate corrective action is required, assuming perhaps that A-330 operators already updated Pitot tubes that were prone to icing and subsequent unreliability of input to on-board automated flight control and monitoring systems. 

   At the time of the crash, there were nasty cells moving about in the vicinity of AF447′s flight track in the Equatorial Zone. Mind you, other airliners made it safely through the same zone at about the same time along different tracks and in the same messy weather. Some of them altered course to avoid the worst of active cells, a manoeuvre that underscores the severity of the weather disturbances in the area where AF447 went down. That much we know.  Part of airline safety is predicated on modern jetliners’ ability to fly above the weather. The equation is not that simple near the Equator where the atmosphere is notoriously unstable up to altitudes of 50,000 feet, way above jetliners’ normal cruising altitudes. At the opposite end, i.e.: way down below, even offshore sailboats crossing the Equatorial Zone feel the wrath of dynamic and unstable air in the form of squalls upon squalls from all directions. Whatever mode of transportation one is using, to allow crossing the equator, Neptune exacts a toll. However, airliners should be impervious to Neptune’s mood swings because of their ability to detect and dodge any significant weather beyond safe and comfortable flight.

   At this point, hinting at the fact that pilot error may have been a contributing factor in the AF447 ocean crash, is premature and also insulting to the highly qualified pilots at the controls of AF447 and to their peers presently flying for reputable airlines around the world.

   Hey, folks!  In the meantime, let us look at the positives as we impatiently await actual info on AF447′s pre-crash moments. This calls for a round of applause for those hard working and determined professionals from various walks of life who finally located and retrieved AF447′s precious black boxes from the Deep Blue. After all, they did find the two sought-after needles in the proverbial haystack, an accomplishment nobody took for granted prior to the fact.

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Trans-Pacific Flight into Japan as Major Earthquake Unravels

Posted on April 13, 2011 by Steve

   The following is an account by a presumed DELTA pilot landing soon after a catastrophic earthquake hit in Japan, a month ago today.

   There is no way to verify the veracity of this account other than by relying on the author’s plain good will, as the flight crew exercised top airmanship in a tight ‘need-to-land’ situation.

   The context? Having to land a ‘heavy’ in Japan after a North Pacific crossing originating from the U.S., staying aloft on reserve fuel soon after the major heart quake hit the North-East area of the country, with repercussions across the country.

   This is a testimonial to the integrity of the civil aviation system in a worst-case scenario, one that does not show up on MS FlightSim.  Suffice it to say that the narrative below has been checked for reported locations, distances, aircraft type and flight time, using Google Earth among other resources.

START NARRATIVE:

“I’m currently still in one piece, writing from my room in the Narita crew hotel. It’s 8am. This is my inaugural trans-pacific trip as a brand new, recently checked out, international 767 Captain and it has been interesting, to say the least, so far. I’ve crossed the Atlantic three times so far so the ocean crossing procedures were familiar.

By the way, stunning scenery flying over the Aleutian Islands. Everything was going fine until 100 miles out from Tokyo and in the descent for arrival. The first indication of any trouble was that Japan air traffic control started putting everyone into holding patterns. At first we thought it was usual congestion on arrival. Then we got a company data link message advising about the earthquake, followed by another stating Narita airport was temporarily closed for inspection and expected to open shortly (the company is always so positive).

From our perspective things were obviously looking a little different. The Japanese controller’s anxiety level seemed quite high and he said expect “indefinite” holding time. No one would commit to a time frame on that so I got my copilot and relief pilot busy looking at divert stations and our fuel situation, which, after an ocean crossing is typically low.

It wasn’t long, maybe ten minutes, before the first pilots started requesting diversions to other airports. Air Canada, American, United, etc. all reporting minimal fuel situations. I still had enough fuel for 1.5 to 2.0 hours of holding. Needless to say, the diverts started complicating the situation.

Japan air traffic control then announced Narita was closed indefinitely due to damage. Planes immediately started requesting arrivals into Haneada, near Tokyo, a half dozen JAL and western planes got clearance in that direction but then ATC announced Haenada had just closed. Uh oh! Now instead of just holding, we all had to start looking at more distant alternatives like Osaka, or Nagoya.

One bad thing about a large airliner is that you can’t just be-pop into any little airport. We generally need lots of runway. With more planes piling in from both east and west, all needing a place to land and several now fuel critical ATC was getting over-whelmed. In the scramble, and without waiting for my fuel to get critical, I got my flight a clearance to head for Nagoya, fuel situation still okay. So far so good. A few minutes into heading that way, I was”ordered” by ATC to reverse course. Nagoya was saturated with traffic and unable to handle more planes (read- airport full). Ditto for Osaka.

With that statement, my situation went instantly from fuel okay, to fuel minimal considering we might have to divert a much farther distance. Multiply my situation by a dozen other aircraft all in the same boat, all making demands requests and threats to ATC for clearances somewhere. Air Canada and then someone else went to “emergency” fuel situation. Planes started to heading for air force bases. The nearest to Tokyo was Yokoda AFB. I threw my hat in the ring for that initially. The answer – Yokoda closed! no more space.

By now it was a three ring circus in the cockpit, my copilot on the radios, me flying and making decisions and the relief copilot buried in the air charts trying to figure out where to go that was within range while data link messages were flying back and forth between us and company dispatch in Atlanta. I picked Misawa AFB at the north end of Honshu island. We could get there with minimal fuel remaining. ATC was happy to get rid of us so we cleared out of the maelstrom of the Tokyo region. We heard ATC try to send planes toward Sendai, a small regional airport on the coast which was later the one I think that got flooded by a tsunami.

Atlanta dispatch then sent us a message asking if we could continue to Chitose airport on the Island of Hokkaido, north of Honshu. Other Delta planes were heading that way. More scrambling in the cockpit – check weather, check charts, check fuel, okay. We could still make it and not be going into a fuel critical situation … if we had no other fuel delays. As we approached Misawa we got clearance to continue to Chitose. Critical decision thought process. Let’s see – trying to help company – plane overflies perfectly good divert airport for one farther away…wonder how that will look in the safety report, if anything goes wrong.

Suddenly ATC comes up and gives us a vector to a fix well short of Chitose and tells us to standby for holding instructions. Nightmare realized. Situation rapidly deteriorating. After initially holding near Tokyo, starting a divert to Nagoya, reversing course back to Tokyo then to re-diverting north toward Misawa, all that happy fuel reserve that I had was vaporizing fast. My subsequent conversation, paraphrased of course…., went something like this:

“Sapparo Control – Delta XX requesting immediate clearance direct to Chitose, minimum fuel, unable hold.”

“Negative Ghost-Rider, the Pattern is full” <<< top gun quote <<<

“Sapparo Control – make that – Delta XX declaring emergency, low fuel, proceeding direct Chitose”

“Roger Delta XX, understood, you are cleared direct to Chitose, contact Chitose approach….etc….”

Enough was enough, I had decided to preempt actually running critically low on fuel while in another indefinite holding pattern, especially after bypassing Misawa, and played my last ace…declaring an emergency. The problem with that is now I have a bit of company paperwork to do but what the heck.

As it was – landed Chitose, safe, with at least 30 minutes of fuel remaining before reaching a “true” fuel emergency situation. That’s always a good feeling, being safe. They taxied us off to some remote parking area where we shut down and watched a half dozen or more other airplanes come streaming in. In the end, Delta had two 747s, my 767 and another 767 and a 777 all on the ramp at Chitose. We saw to American airlines planes, a United and two Air Canada as well. Not to mention several extra Al Nippon and Japan Air Lines planes.

Post-script – 9 hours later, Japan air lines finally got around to getting a boarding ladder to the plane where we were able to get off and clear customs. – that however, is another interesting story.

By the way – while writing this – I have felt four additional tremors that shook the hotel slightly – all in 45 minutes.

Cheers, J.D.”

END NARRATIVE 

  

Feel free to comment below

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Bush Pilots: where the real flying was and is

Posted on January 24, 2011 by Steve

   What is real flying?  Tricky question. A good one, though, one that, for the sake of animated discussion, has to do with  the essence of flying and deserves a crack at a straight-forward and meaningful answer, especially in the present era of glass cockpits and fly-by-wire control systems for airliners. The question came up in the context of a series of videos by National Geographic linked to at the end of this post.

   The answer certainly does not turn on the meaning of unreal flying or on comparing simulator flying with the operation of real aircraft, for that matter.

   Rather, real flying in this post is mostly centered on a sense of nostalgia or current interest for the commercial operation, in remote areas with few facilities, of single-engine piston aircraft with proven designs that have stood the test of time: 50 years for some bush planes. Piston work horses, they just as well may be called. However, twin turbine engine airplanes, such as the Twin Otter, with the ability of landing on unprepared surfaces also fit in bush flying operations.

   Bush flying is often associated with mountain flying where wilderness encompasses both remote low-lying areas and mountainous terrain.

   Real flying is, of course, both a relative and subjective concept. An analogy can be made between real flying and non-competitive real sailing, for instance. Real sailing involves blue water cruising such as extended passage-making on infrequently travelled routes, during which the skipper and his or her crew are located somewhere offshore, days of sailing away from any source of help should weather conditions drastically deteriorate or essential equipment break down. Bush pilots sometimes meet similar situations between refueling points, especially in areas or in weather conditions making a rescue attempt difficult to achieve in a reasonable amount of time. In the case of bush flying, remoteness is not simply a matter of distance from the nearest rescue facility. It is alo the consequence of light bush aircraft, whether of the fixed-wing or rotary-wing type, being able to get into places that are downright difficult for air and ground rescue teams to reach. Isolation in distance or in time goes to the very heart of bush flying and sets it apart from other types of commercial flight operations.

   Another more encompassing aspect of bush flying is that it takes place at lower atltitudes than airline operations. As a rule of thumb, the ability to fly above the weather separates commercial airline operations from bush flying.

   This is why real flying can be readily linked to bush flying. Commercial flight in today’s Canada and America’s far North started with bush flying, not necessarily far up North in the olden days of commercial aviation. 

   Bush flying is about humanity, the necessities of life in the Great White North, linking small isolated communities, applying flying skills to often unpredictable situations, knowing how to interpret surface conditions from the air and dealing with wilderness, changing weather conditions, and skimpy but gradually improving infrastructure. By and large, it is essential transportation. It is also about catering to explorers, scientists, seasonal fishermen and hunters from the South.

   For bush pilots, bush flying entails self-reliance, sound judgment and outdoor survival skills. They take flying conditions as they come, within limits of course. Planning future needs comes second ever since the early stages of aviation. Dealing with the ‘now’ comes first. Rescuing stranded people, bringing medical staff and supplies where most needed, including humanitarian and spiritual support, come first.

   Bush pilots step in where remote dirt roads end up North, where plain human and natural environment beg for outside contact, attention and protection. They enjoy their job even though it’s not a comfortable one. There is no 9 to 5 daily schedule, one of the many aspects that actually define bush flying. It is a beautiful one, though, partly because of their contact with wilderness and partly because they feel they are needed and appreciated. They can be tour-guides, paramedics, pastors to name but a few callings that make bush flying a practical job.

   They know how to land on water, on snow with properly equipped aircraft, and on unprepared landing surfaces, level or not.

   Click on the following link to access a National Geographic series on the theme of bush flying, illustrating the above observations.

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Supersonic Concorde legal saga not over yet.

Posted on December 22, 2010 by Steve

Criminal proceedings into the deadly Concorde crash opened in early 2010, more than 10 years after the event. The resulting trial judgment issued on December 6, 2010, which laid criminal liability on one Continental Airlines mechanic and consequently on his employer, is doubtful. In fact, most of the defendants, as well as the prosecution, are appealing the ruling. What possibly went wrong – not in the crash itself – but in the court’s decision that has lead most of the parties on both sides of the case to file an appeal?      

   July 2000. An Air France Concorde supersonic airliner crashes north of Paris Charles de Gaulle airport shortly after take-off, killing all on board in addition to three persons on the ground, for a total of 113 casualties, not to mention post-traumatic stress disorders that witnesses at the scene are still experiencing.     

   Early 2010: a French court in Pontoise (north of Paris) initiates hearings in search of possible criminal liability involved in the major air crash.     

   December 6, 2010: The Pontoise court issues a judgment holding an American aircraft mechanic and his employer, Continental Airlines, directly responsible for the Concorde crash (one of Continental’s DC-10s dropped a metal strip on the runway just before Concorde’s take-off on the same runway.)  Other defendants, such as Air France and the top manager in charge of the Concorde development program are acquitted because their actions in terms of continuing airworthiness are assessed as merely neglectful.     

   Air France, even though acquitted at trial, files an appeal requesting that it also be involved in the appeal process in order to clear its name after the damaging submissions made against it by Continental Airlines’ defense lawyer. This move is perceived as an attempt by Air France to restore its good reputation as a major airline.  Meanwhile, the Air France Rio-to-Paris Airbus crash trial is coming up soon. A lot of questions will need to be answered there too. Air France is likely wanting this other trial to start from a clean slate, with no negative inferences about its reputation arising from the Concorde trial.     

   On December 21, we learn of a new twist in the Concorde case that could also defeat the trial judgment: the State prosecution in Pontoise is appealing the acquittal of other defendants in the case, namely the top manager in charge of the Concorde program and another similarly important executive in charge of Concorde’s continuing airworthiness.     

   This looks like a typical case of back to square one, more than 10 years after the sad loss of innocent lives in the crash.     

   Arguments against the judgment issued by the trial judge on December 6, 2010, may be summarily stated as follows:     

1) causation and foreseeability of crash: there is no valid reason to pin direct liability on a Continental Airlines’ maintenance engineer for having improperly affixed a metal strip to the Continental DC-10 that took off ahead of Concorde, leading one of Concorde’s tires to blow apart with debris puncturing the underside of the wing, thereby causing the unforeseeable wing tank fire that brought Concorde down to a fiery and deadly crash two minutes after take-off;     

2) willful blindness: Air France and Aérospatiale’s (now EADS) top Concorde program managers were acquitted too easily, when evidence points to possible willful blindness about known design weaknesses of Concorde and repeated take-off incidents due to blown tires prior to the crash. How can such a gorgeous looking airliner have any faults, one might ask. Think again. Several observers have wondered whether national prestige may have played a role in shielding Concorde from impartial scrutiny in technical issues plaguing the government-backed French supersonic transport program. If that were the case, can a French trial judge make such a finding even if it entails lifting the political veil?     

3) knowingly exposing a third party to the risk of an accident resulting in known disastrous consequences («faute caractérisée»): according to legal commentators, the trial judge may have wrongly applied the recent statutory concept in French criminal law of «faute caractérisée», to the conduct of the Continental Airlines mechanic. This concept has no statutory definition; it is still in the process of being clarified by the French courts. And yet, it is a key concept upon which the Continental Airlines mechanic was held responsible for the crash.

   Lesson learned again: major airline disasters cannot be fully dealt with through ordinary criminal proceedings. A special public inquiry would have been preferable, assuming French law provides for such a venue. Too many technical elements are at stake in major aviation accidents. The sheer magnitude of non-natural disasters of public interest stands as an obstacle for ordinary criminal courts to rule on them meaningfully, no matter how many technical experts take the stand in support of and against the charges, or even as amici curiae (neutral advisors to the court.) The drawback with public inquiries is that they are in many cases limited to making specific findings not involving liability at all and to drafting recommendations for air safety improvements. Public inquiries get a lot of public attention, which is in the public interest of course. However, once their recommendations are issued, they are not necessarily binding and it is up to the concerned public authorities to act and follow up on them. Because of such limitations, the actual outcome of public inquiries is often uncertain.     

   Let’s make it clear again: though it is virtually impossible to put a dollar figure on the loss of a human life, relatives of persons who died in or as a result of the Concorde crash have been adequately compensated for years ago. One can only hope that the same relatives have had some degree of closure, keeping in mind that ultimate closure and solace reside in knowing that such horrendous and preventable crashes never happen again.      

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Judge’s Decision on the July 2000 Crash of Concorde

Posted on December 5, 2010 by Steve

   Tomorrow Monday, December 6, the judge presiding over the trial of persons prosecuted for their alleged involvement in the crash of an Air France Concorde in Paris in July 2000 is expected to issue her decision months after the public hearings of  the criminal proceedings ended. Determining where, if any, personal and corporate liability lay in such a complex environment as the operation of Concorde must have been a long and arduous task for the judge.

   Criminal proceedings were initiated years after the fiery post-takeoff crash of the French airliner at Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Airport, just north of Paris. The technical accident investigation had to run its course first. It was late in releasing its findings about the contributing causes of the highly publicised accident.

   The legal liability saga started when 113 persons, a few of them on the ground, lost their lives soon after fire erupted under the left wing of Concorde during take-off, causing the prestigious supersonic airliner, which was carrying mainly German tourists on a charter flight to North America, to crash 2 minutes after take-off.

   Seconds after clearing Concorde for take-off, the tower controller saw flames streaming from the aircraft during the take-off run and immediately radioed the problem to Concorde’s captain. Unfortunately, the aircraft had already reached near take-off speed and Captain Marty, a pilot with unimpeachable flying credentials, decided quickly that it was safer to proceed with the take-off and then make an emergency landing at Le Bourget airport a few miles away. His decision was based, of course, on what he and his cockpit crew members knew about Concorde’s condition at the time. In their minds, aborting take-off at high speed with insufficient runway length to bring the fully loaded aircraft to a safe stop was not an option.

   Concorde never made it to Le Bourget. Both engines underneath the left wing lost power gradually after fire broke out, making the aircraft roll slowly to the left and crash out-of-control in a ball of fire on a hotel property located 2 miles away from the runway.

   What happened next is sad history for relatives and friends of the victims. Most of them were compensated all right, but the lingering doubt as to who was to blame for the awful mess remained unsolved. This was perhaps the hardest part for them to accept.

   Now, more than ten years after the tragic loss of their loved ones, they might find out which person or persons, including corporate entities, are to be held criminally liable for the events leading to the crash, and why. Knowing ‘why’ is most important in that it will bring some comfort in knowing that such aviation accidents will never be allowed to happen again.

   The long-awaited answer is expected to be handed down on Monday December 6, 2010, in the Justice buildings of Pontoise, north of Paris.

   One can only hope the decision will bring final closure to those who need it 10 years after the fact and that it will also clarify the hinge-points of responsibility for those involved in the Concorde programme from its early start until the July 2000 crash, including a Continental Airline aircraft maintenance engineer who had nothing to do with Concorde’s operations. According to French prosecutors, he, his supervisor and his employer precipitated events underlying Concorde’s crash due to negligence.

   Much attention will be focused on the decision when it is issued. It could take a day or two for reporters and the more cautious legal commentators to fully explain the four corners of the judgment.

   One might seriously question the wisdom of having criminal proceedings take place after a technical investigation. The media is likely to raise issues of dysfunctionality and duplication of strained public resources in this regard. After all, ten years is a long time to pinpoint the technical and criminal causes of a major aviation accident, especially as the European Union is moving towards streamlining investigations and inquiries into accidents and incidents concerning the safety of public transportation.

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