The European consortium EADS is still ahead of the game on that level, by most accounts. For example, EADS has allowed China years ago to assemble Airbus 320 on site, knowing that outsourcing often results in a transfer of technology most likely beyond the limit stipulated by contract. Boeing, on the other hand, chose safe subcontractors in its outsourcing policy, from within the USA or with predictable economic partners such as the U.K., perhaps under pressure from the controversial Buy American Policy.            

   Boeing’s claim to put into service a new transport jet, the B-787 Dreamliner, that will emit 20% less pollution and burn less fuel* is not all that impressive inasmuch as the claim can very well be perceived as being too little too late. Also, such welcoming figures are not wholly in response to pressure from environmentalist organizations. On the positive side, the claim does signal a new trend that might accelerate in the next couple of decades, still behind previous promises made in Copenhagen and Davos. Moreover, who should really be credited for that reduction in pollution levels: Rolls Royce, General Electric or both?            

Boeing 787 Dreamliner

   Isn’t it unsettling that news media consider the Boeing 787 and the Airbus 380 as totally different aircraft, and yet track them both as bed-fellows in the sky in terms of the race for the highest number of firm purchase orders? More reliable sales figures will emerge after the Farnborough show is over. Even then, the figures will not be finalized because one has to differentiate firm orders from other variations of formal interest in the purchase of new passenger jets, namely options to buy either aircraft. After all, Boeing’s sell/purchase contracts might not worded in the same way as those normally used by EADS, for instance in matters regarding penalties for cancellation, not to mention the airlines’ own brand of stipulations. Grouping sale figures under one concept of sale and purchase agreement is risky for aviation reporters and analysts.            

   The Airbus A-380 and the Boeing Dreamliner yield different cost figures on a seat-per-mile basis. It would be most interesting to find out which one is the uncontested winner on that score. In the case of the Airbus A-380 in particular, the difficulty will be to focus on a seating configuration that will carry the day in terms of profitability. Seating arrangements can vary between 550 to 850 passenger seats, depending on the scheduled routes flown and type of airline. It is obvious Ryanair will not choose the same cabin configuration as Emirates Airlines.            

Airbus A-380

   Would you know that the Douglas DC-7 would not have seen the light of day in the early 50s, had the Douglas Aircraft Company not managed to secure 40 million dollars worth of firm contracts while the most advanced  and last piston-engine transport aircraft was still on the drawing board? However, trading in new advanced passenger jets nowadays offers aircraft development financing solutions as creative as those used for the purchase of new transport aircraft types rolling off assembly plants, within WTO safeguards, of course.            

PS: Aircraft fuel-efficiency is a relative concept resulting mainly from the economic circumstances of the day for airlines, knowing that fuel costs alone amount to around 30% of operating costs. At present, one would be hard pressed to find general standards of fuel efficiency set out by aeronautical regulatory agencies.

   Nearly anytime people believe that all has been said and told about a deceased celebrity, something new turns up about that person, with the potential of yielding more meaningful details about the person’s life.

   The person in this case is famed aviator and writer Antoine de Saint-Exupéry known initially for his contribution to the development and operation of the longest scheduled air mail service on record in the post WW1 period.  Once completed, the air mail route spanned from France to Brazil, Argentina and Peru, via Spain, Morocco and Senegal. He wrote his first novels in the same period.

   Later, Saint-Exupéry took part in WW2 initially by flying reconnaissance missions over German-occupied parts of northern France. That did not stop him from pursuing his boundless passion for writing novels inspired by his deep sense of humanity and sometimes too by his former work as an air mail pilot and aerodrome manager. In terms of fiction writing, he authored the widely acclaimed short novel “The Little Prince”.  He also left behind volumes of personal observations of current events and letters to friends and relatives quite revealing about his times.

   Briefly stated, he was a flying author, reporter, story-teller and philosopher of sorts, the inspiring figure PhD students wrote their thesis on or literary critiques turned their attention to.

   After a two-year stay in New York, he joined Allies in North Africa and was eventually posted in Corsica from where he acted as a military reconnaissance pilot. He flew one such military reconnaissance mission on July 31, 1944, but failed to return to base. Accordingly, he was reported as “missing in action” as of that day.

   The new twist now about Saint-Exupéry comes in the form of four new photographs of him and a log book of the P-38 he flew, all of which were kept by French collector, Raymond Duriez. Report of this discovery first came last week from the French daily “Ouest-France” and was picked up on June 15, 2010, in an article published in Le Monde, one of France’s national dailies and online news sources.

   What is behind the latest new twist about him? The fact is since American reporter John Phillips interviewed Saint-Exupéry in May 1944 at his military air base and took professional-quality  pictures of him, the paper trail ended there chronologically speaking, except for an entry found decades later in a Luftwaffe pilot’s log book stating to have shot down a P-38 Lightening aircraft on the day and over the area Saint-Exupéry was reported to have gone missing.

   Another online French daily, Liberation.fr  also picked up the story on June 18, 2010, and commented on the meaning of the newly found photos. However, it further commented on a  log book presumably preserved along with the photos in a small cardboard box. The log book, the veracity and authenticity of which have yet to be confirmed, contains entries stating that the P-38 Lightening flown by Saint-Exupéry and other pilots was plagued by mechanical issues and failures. Details of the mechanical problems are not publicly known yet.

   If the log book entries prove accurate and authentic, they would provide yet another explanation for Saint-Exupéry’s non-return from his last recon mission. High altitude photo reconnaissance missions on a P-38 were physically and mentally demanding by several accouns. It was originally thought he, intentionally or not, allowed his P-38 to impact the Mediterranean Sea at high speed, or that he was shot down by a German combat pilot flying above him as noted in a Luftwaffe pilot’s log book found after the war.

   The pilot in question, Horst Rippert, expressed sadness in 2008, at having unknowingly shot down, in July 1944, Saint-Exupéry whom he knew as an aviation writer and considered as a heroic French aviator.

   However, the in-flight mechanical failure theory could shed a totally different light on the reasons for Saint-Exupéry’s fatal mission. An experienced peace-time and war-time pilot, Saint-Exupéry was only 44 years years of age on the day he vanished while flying an advanced P-38 aircraft. By the medical fitness standards of the day, he was over-aged for that type of military mission. Yet, through persistence, he obtained permission to fly a limited number of photo-reconnaissance missions. He most likely busted that limit too with his legendary eloquence and art of persuasion. There was no stopping him, so it seems.

   Biographers and military historians confirm that Saint-Exupéry flew successful missions with P-38 type aircraft and that he provided Allies with relevant, if not crucial, intelligence on German positions in France.

   He was too young to die and considered too old to fly but, above all, he proved himself useful to the very end. He could not live in any way other than being a novelist and a man of action, more specifically a pilot in active military duty for the benefit of France and humanity at large.

THE CASE OF THE CONCORDE CRASH IN JULY  2000, AT ROISSY AIRPORT, PARIS.

   Ah, the wonderful world of aviation together with a volcano eruption in Iceland have me delayed in Europe and unable to provide a proper follow-up on the Concorde crash proceedings in Pontoise (Paris) or any other interesting aviation matters!

   The one point worth sharing on this blog, for now at any rate, is a recent comment made to me by a Belgian lawyer who regularly represents clients in the U.S. and has a broader perspective on the present Concorde trial near Paris, as a result of dealing with the Civil Law system and the American Law system.

   It would seem that if the crash of Concorde had occurred in the U.S. for instance, most, if not all, issues surrounding the crash, whether civil or criminal in nature, would have been settled out-of-court or dealt with through plea-bargaining, or possibly also through a judicial inquiry with recommendation powers only. Although current criminal proceedings in Pontoise seem tedious, the same lawyer stated that Justice would not have been publicly visible without them, contrary to out-of-court settlement and plea-bargaining processes that typically do not result in full public disclosure and debate.

   Well, food for thought…So far, I was inclined to think the current criminal proceedings were not suitable for an aviation crash of such magnitude and in light of the irreparable damage to supersonic transport known so far.

   As a side-comment, I was struck in the last month by the number of references in public media to the so-called Concorde trial. Concorde is not on trial, of course; it is just a way of expressing the significance of the crash that brought a legend to a sudden stop. The trial is aimed more specifically at key figures involved in the French/British Concorde project since 1960.  It is open to debate whether or not the right figures were picked out by judicial authorities on the French side of the joint Concorde project and why the U.K. was left out.

   It was stated in a previous posting on this blog that the Concorde program was prestige-driven. This was certainly a major factor, to the point where major decisions about the continuation of the Concorde program were admittedly taken at a political level. Whether this situation had any impact on the necessary airworthiness upgrades for Concorde remains to be seen.

   In fact, he Concorde program was not entirely prestige-driven. Up to the early 1990s, there was still hope that the program might keep the U.K. and France at the forefront of knowledge and experience in SST technology while, across the Atlantic, their Americans counterparts were pursuing the same objective. More precisely, a second generation Concorde was unofficially in the offing. In addition, the words “prestige-driven” do not necessarily apply to the pragmatic desire for passengers to fly at twice the speed of sound, provided they could afford it. However, such words do capture the ‘magic’ of supersonic flight for some passengers and public figures, and also the need to maintain the public image of France and the U.K. as leading countries in aeronautical technology.

   Are such considerations material to the current Concorde trial in Pontoise? I submit they are, as these factual elements point to the highest political levels in matters concerning large expenditures of public funds to finance the upkeep and perceived safety requirements of Concorde, on the French side of the channel anyway. This was, in my opinion, the overall framework of the Concorde program until disaster struck quite unfortunately for 113 innocent lives, not counting the number of affected relatives and friends, and witnesses at the crash scene.

   Had there been no public criminal proceedings or other transparent venues related to the crash of Concorde in July 2000, how could have the aviation community, concerned airline passengers and interested members of the public  become aware that Concorde was a unique transport aircraft to the point of being certified under a separate set of rules, and operated under separate continuing airworthiness rules as well, quite apart from those applicable to popular subsonic airliners? This question begs another: is the safety level of an airliner dependent on its pedigree? Concorde had no pedigree, except perhaps for the application of military supersonic technology and experience to a much larger an demanding civilian aircraft. Furthermore, few units of Concorde were built and operated. The result is that Concorde was operated for decades as a public transport aircraft, with limited engineering and technical feedback derived from operational experience. Both British Airways and Air France made the best of such limited feedback. That much we know, to their credit.

   With respect, however, as dedicated, knowledgeable and safety-minded the designers, engineers, manufacturers and operators of Concorde aircraft were in their times, the whole Anglo-French SST program was conducted in some sort of vacuum. In fact, Concorde kept on transporting paying passengers for decades with patchwork engineering solutions being applied from one “incident” to the next until the “accident” occurred. Furthermore, concerned civil authorities and Concorde programme managers had not set, as far as we can tell,  a gradual retirement plan for Concorde, despite its increasingly obsolete technology.  As a matter of fact, much of the current Pontoise proceedings hinge upon the issue of foreseeability of a catastrophic failure of Concorde, such as the crash that occurred near Paris in July 2000.

   Which way was the Concorde programme heading just before one of its units crashed near Paris? This is one question that should be answered in the context of the current criminal responsibility hearings in Pontoise (France). The lone judge presiding over the hearings is expected to issue publicly her findings and decision in December 2010.

   In fairness, she might also put Concorde’s 27 years of accident-free commercial operations in the balance. After all, the civil aviation community will be looking at the important outcome of a very public – yet belated – trial of civil aviation past and modern practices.

   The criminal proceedings into the supersonic airliner Concorde’s deadly crash in Paris nearly ten years ago, are in the fourth week of judicial hearing with no clear and undisputed explanation of the root cause of the crash. Justice officials reckon the Pontoise proceedings will last four months at least in order to find the truth as to who is criminally liable for the crash.

   Before the current criminal proceedings were initiated on February 2nd, 2010, an accident investigation report was completed by the BEA (Bureau des enquêtes accident) in which the root cause of the crash of Concorde has been identified as a metal strip that fell off a Continental Airlines DC-10 which took off four minutes ahead of the ill-fated Air France Concorde on the same runway. The technical accident report by the BEA is already a few years old. Why it took so long for criminal proceedings to get underway afterwards is anyone’s guess. However, the purpose of the current criminal proceedings held in Pontoise is to determine if there is conclusive evidence to convict Air France, Continental Airlines and/or two aircraft maintenance employees of Continental on the charge of involuntary homicide.

   Basically, the criminal proceedings have evolved from preliminary procedural issues to actual substantive ones argued by both the prosecution and defense lawyers during the third week. Repeated requests by counsel for Continental Airlines to have the charges against defendants dismissed on a number of grounds have been noted by the presiding judge who will deal with them later. This is to allow the proceedings to continue on the merits of the case instead of being bogged down in procedure.

   A number of civil aviation experts and lawyers are still claiming, both outside and inside the courtroom, that criminal proceedings have no place in an aviation disaster of such magnitude, once terrorism and foul play are ruled out at the initial investigation stage. Furthermore, all families of the 113 victims have been fairly compensated and are not part of the present proceedings. The reason for family members of Concorde’s captain, Christian Marty, to attend the Pontoise proceedings as civil parties is to protect the stellar flying record of the captain who also died in crash. Their goal is to ensure that Captain Marty will not be scapegoated or denigrated in absentia. According to some media sources, it would seem that during the two minutes of emergency handling in Concorde’s cockpit, the cockpit voice recorder makes it sound as if Captain Marty was running his own show while the First Officer and Flight Engineer were discussing quickly various ways of dealing with the loss of power in the two port side engines.

   Media sources sometimes don’t have the inside view as to what is actually going on in the cockpit of an airliner in distress. Assuming Captain Marty was the flying pilot, it would have been quite normal for the First Officer and Flight Engineer to deal with the technical problems at hand, leaving the Captain with the delicate task of keeping Concorde under control in the final stage of take-off and during initial climb, while these recorded discussions were taking place.

   So why all the fuss now, in a French criminal court, over this sad episode in the recent history of civil aviation?

(a) To further compensate victims’ relatives? No. They have been well compensated by now in a non-American way quite acceptable to Europeans. To my knowledge, champerty does not apply to possible civil proceedings based on judicial findings in Pontoise. This means that there would be little to gain from launching civil trials or a class action suit after the Pontoise proceedings.

(b) To prevent the same type of air crash from occurring? My mitigated answer here is also “no”, because Concorde’s crash might result from old corporate wisdom partly based on the “word of honour” system amongst highly competent professionals in the 1960s. Such a system had the potential of keeping up the prestige of an aeronautical success story at the expense of flight safety. This safety culture no longer applies to modern-day airline service. Instead, the concept of risk management has made a quantum leap since Concorde was designed, manufactured and put into service.

(c) To ascribe criminal liability to one or several defendants? Not necessarily, as French society is not seeking retribution. However, the aim of digging out, through the court adversarial process, more accurate facts than the BEA accident report provides is quite justifiable, because the BEA’s expert accident report is essentially a one-sided report. Perhaps, more can be learned through the Pontoise criminal proceedings than is known so far about the actual cause or causes of the crash. That being said, one should refrain from readily assuming that the present criminal proceedings are aimed at meeting out criminal sanctions against corporations and individuals involved in the Concorde program since its inception the early 60s. Furthermore, the proceedings are likely, in my humble opinion, to exonerate once and for all Continental Airlines of any criminal action leading up to Concorde’s crash. If anything, Continental Airlines could turn around when the Pontoise proceedings are over and initiate a lawsuit against the French government for abuse of process or wrongful/malicious (whichever) prosecution. Why? Because Continental’s lawyer requested at the very beginning of the proceedings a dismissal of the charges against his client and the presiding judge at the Pontoise hearings decided to go ahead anyway with Continental and two of its employees as co-defendants.

(d) To settle outstanding insurance matters? Possibly, although in a number of jurisdictions, criminal liability does not automatically lead to civil liability as well.

   Over the years, various civil aviation commentators and Concorde experts have pointed out that the success of the Concorde program depended on the ability of Concorde to stay well ahead of subsonic airliners’ transatlantic flying time, namely by maintaining tightly scheduled departures and arrivals times between Paris/London and New York, and vice versa. This pressure on Concorde personnel, some would say, lead Air France employees to curb potential departure delays even if it meant taking short cuts in dispatch and aircraft maintenance action. These allegations are suspect, if not foolhardy, in that they would entail that Air France’s top-notch pilots carefully selected to operate Concorde would compromise safety over time to destination. Such a scenario does not stand to reason in today’s airlines circles. There is too much at stake. Even student pilots are educated in this basic principle of flight safety philosophy and good airmanship.

   Other commentators claim that Concorde was behind the times in terms of airworthiness when the Paris crash occurred. Some also claim that officials responsible for the Concorde program turned a blind eye to airworthiness issues, managing risk in their own way, a way that would keep the obsolete Concorde pointing visibly towards the future of supersonic transport flight.

   Counsel for Continental Airlines has maintained form the start of the Pontoise proceedings that the charges against Continental are pointless and must be dismissed at the first opportunity for two reasons:

1) a relatively small piece of metal left on the runway from which Concorde took off four minutes after the Continental DC-10 should not have lead to such disastrous consequences, taking into account airworthiness standards in force in the year 2000; and

2) fire erupted on Concorde’s left wing during the take-off roll before contact with metal strip (Continental claims to have 20 eyewitnesses on hand to support this contention). However, this part of the defense contradicts French investigation experts who were able to pinpoint the area on the runway where Concorde’s left landing gear came into contact with the metal strip. Furthermore, the same experts also found the point further down the runway where traces of kerosene appear on the runway’s surface, where there shouldn’t be any in ordinary circumstances.

   Below are a few of the points canvassed by counsel for opposing parties:

(1) The lab testing of tire burst by experts is not conclusive. Their technical findings must be corroborated in some way or another because of the impossibility of recreating identical conditions as the ill-fated Concorde went through during the take-off run. According to an experienced former Concorde captain, running over an object during Concorde’s rotation (at about 190 kts, i.e.: 320 km/h approx.) increases the load on tires and makes them more vulnerable to runway debris, even though Concorde’s tires had been made more resistant to such debris and to slightly damaged runway surfaces well after initial airworthiness certification.

(2) Counsel for Continental has repeatedly cast doubt on the impartiality of Concorde’s post-crash examination, because one expert was still on salary from Air France at the time. The expert in question relies through his counsel on the French aviation culture of “the word of honour” in relation to Concorde’s original designers and to the early Concorde program administrators. Such was indeed the culture of those days. However, can “the word of honour” culture still be invoked nowadays by way of defense against allegations of self-interest or partiality in an aircraft accident investigation?

(3) Outside critics comment that the presiding judge is wrong in temporarily not allowing the scope of the Pontoise proceedings to be extended beyond the matters covered by the BEA accident investigation report.

(4) The outcome of the Pontoise proceedings is unpredictable at this stage. In fact, much of it depends on the weight of evidence put forth by counsel for Continental as to when flames started to visibly stream behind Concorde during the take-off run.

(5) Concorde’s delta wing design had faults, despite popular thinking to the contrary. For further reading on this topic, simply look at this thorough article on Concorde available on the Global Security website. In fact, in the later part of the fourth week of hearings, experts have testified in the Pontoise proceedings that Concorde did not stand a chance to climb out with only two out of four engines running, especially with the two good engines being on the right side of the supersonic airliner. Also according to expert evidence in the proceedings, the ingestion by one of the four jet engines of roughly 100 grams of tire debris was enough to cause serious trouble to the proper operation of the engine type. Expert evidence underlined again the frailty of Concorde. Back in 1995, another Concorde on approach to JFK Airport in New York lost power on one engine due to a bird strike and started throwing broken parts into the engine right next to it. The flight crew of Concorde involved in that incident managed to complete a safe landing.

3 June 1995.  An Air France Concorde, at about 10 feet AGL while landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport (NY), ingested 1 or 2 Canada geese into the #3 engine.  The engine suffered an uncontained failure.  Shrapnel from the #3 engine destroyed the #4 engine and cut several hydraulic lines and control cables.  The pilot was able to land the plane safely but the runway was closed for several hours.  Damage to the Concorde was estimated at over $7 million.  The French Aviation Authority sued the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and eventually settled out of court for $5.3 million.  (Source: Birdstrike.org)

(6) As a side comment, attempts to address Concorde’s noise and environmental issues were made over the years at great expense, albeit with no significant results. All Concordes would have been retired soon or later due to public pressure. It is saddening that British Airways’ Concordes and especially Air France’s Concordes were removed from service on such a tragic note, despite airworthiness improvements being made to the whole fleet as a result of the Paris crash. Even without the disastrous Paris crash, all Concordes would have been retired soon or later because of a slump in the number of passengers willing to pay extra money for the sake of shaving off half the flight time on transatlantic flights.

(7) In the end, however, the old question remains: should concerned civil aviation authorities have acted more quickly in issuing airworthiness directives in respect of Concorde, and monitored compliance by Air France with such directives? Should the same authorities have shown more proactive and transparent inspections and investigations, as well as a generally higher duty of care toward paying passengers in relation to a supersonic aircraft fleet born straight out of the 1960s’ supersonic aircraft manufacturing know-how? 

(8) In the last decade, the EADS consortium took over the Concorde project from Aérospatiale, the original manufacturer. EADS was not saddled with the responsibility of issuing non-mandatory service bulletins with respect to Concorde’s airworthiness issues. However, it would seem (and this area of responsibility is somewhat murky) that EADS was more involved in taking supersonic air transport to new ‘heights’ instead of keeping the existing project in good flying order. Consequently, EADS was not named as a defendant in the current criminal proceedings; however, former Aérospatiale executives have been so named.

   Concorde had technical issues that, until the Paris crash, were addressed with mixed results. Was Concorde’s original design such that the aircraft was, realistically speaking, upwardly compatible with advances in aeronautical engineering and technology? Or could it be that airworthiness issues, such as updated certification standards, were ignored by civil aviation authorities on the strength of Concorde’s prestigious image among airline passengers? After all, the travelling public was confident until the Paris crash of Concorde that such a sleek and modern looking supersonic aircraft still had a long future ahead.

   Concorde was a legend by all accounts, a legend that possibly led to complacency on matters of design safety and airworthiness upgrades, coupled with sheer bad luck. Murphy’s Law stepped in to bring down an aviation giant. If only 113 lives had been spared in the process…

The greatness of Concorde lies not only in the amount of engineering, flight testing, lobbying for acceptance in foreign countries, and money allocated to the supersonic transport jet mega-project, but also in the purity and elegance of its profile, lines and curvatures together with graceful manoeuvres on take-off and landing, and overall sheer good looks (decibels quite apart, I admit). Moreover, Concorde  kicked off a passionate debate in the far recesses of my own mind: did she look sleek by design or as a result of  her suitability as an airliner in both a subsonic climb to altitude and approach to land environment on the one hand, and a supersonic cruising environment on the other?

Imagine the engineering ingenuity  that went into designing a flap-less delta-wing supersonic airliner fit for existing airports. The end result was an aircraft both so streamlined and functional that body-style designers, such as Ferrari, perhaps could not have dreamed of for any vehicle. At high levels of attack on take-off and landing with her drooped nose, she maintained a graceful look, something straight out of an artist’s imagination.

Most people did not realise also how much engineering know-how had to be applied in order for Concorde to stretch and contract in length as her skin went from low temperatures to high temperatures generated  by Mach 2.2 cruise flight on her wings and fuselage. A civil aviation marvel she was indeed.

By hubris or not, the magnitude of the Concorde project which, some say, helped usher France and the U.K. into the European Union, reflects the hopes and aspirations of a whole generation. Continents would be linked in less than half the time it takes for subsonic jets to fly the same intercontinental routes.

The frailty of Concorde can be found in her anachronism. Her splendour was obvious; however, she was born out of older technology, a problem that a number of reputable aeroplanes, such as the DC-3 and the Boeing 707, to name but a few, shared with Concorde, albeit with fewer news coverage of dramatic and fatal signs of aging.

This airliner was the subject of much attention by both pro-Concorde and anti-Concorde interest groups. A compromise agreement was struck: Concorde would be allowed to overfly populated areas at subsonic speeds only.

Why would dual flag-carrying airliners such as Concorde be allowed to operate amongst slower jetliners built to recent, more stringent and more efficient aeronautical and environmental standards? Oh yes, I hear: “She was grandfathered in.” If so, should public authorities keep on protecting, from a regulatory perspective, a beautiful aeronautical product from a recent past at the cost of putting lives at risk until other circumstances brought its commercial use to an end?

How many people would nowadays go for a ride in a hot air balloon built in all respects like the original Montgolfier brother’s (presumably) successful model?

France and the U.K. had every reason to be jointly proud of Concorde. The problem is neither country knew when to confine the aging supersonic airliner in a museum before disaster struck. Did the the Concorde program change to a prestige-driven venture only? This was likely the case since a number of jet aircraft of an older vintage and no longer allowed to carry paying passengers are still allowed to carry freight. Unfortunately, Concorde did not have a  fall-back commercial niche; flying the Jet Set at premium airfares was its only remaining one.

When Concorde crashed after her fateful take-off from Roissy, she was technologically decades behind her times, even if she could fly at more than twice the speed of other jetliners.

The Concorde disaster in Paris has a positive fall-out: the growing opinion that high-speed intercontinental travel should perhaps be carried out above the atmosphere, i.e. with “suborbital vehicles” (for lack of a better term). What is being designed now for such flights is not an improved existing concept, but a totally different one: a transport vehicle  such as the one recently unveiled by Virgin Air’s CEO, Richard Branson and by Dick Rutan, an expert in composite materials and innovative aircraft designs.

NASA is wise in phasing-out the current space shuttles. In fact, the U.S. space agency had set a life expectancy for its fleet of space shuttles.

Were the U.K. and France in the process of acting likewise for Concorde when the Paris crash occurred? Civil aviation authorities in both countries may have set a time limit only as a result of Concorde’s unfortunate crash in Paris.

Having said this, the future looks bright for supersonic intercontinental travel using suborbital trajectories with whatever vehicles will foot the bill in terms of commercial feasibility.

Happy New Year !

PS: With the underside of their delta wing strengthened after the deadly crash of a Concorde shortly after take-off from Paris-CDG airport in 2000, other Concorde units resumed commercial transatlantic flights under the Air France and British Airways banners. All Concorde units were finally retired in 2003, owing to excessive operating costs to both airlines. Concorde had flown commercially for nearly 30 years with no reported casualties until the most unfortunate Paris crash.  See Wikipedia for further details about the history of Concorde.

The rule-making powers of the EU Commission will be expanded from its present focus on aircraft certification to include the power to set new rules governing aviation accidents and incidents across the EU, and to administer the new rules.

So far, the investigation of aviation safety breaches is performed by the civil aviation authorities of member countries. By consolidating and regulating the investigation and prevention of such breaches, the EU Commission will ensure that this important task is performed in a standardized manner in order to achieve enhanced independence and efficiency of the investigation and prevention processes.

The purpose of this proposed major change in the civil aviation regulatory framework in EU countries is well explained in this press release. Suffice it to say that economies of scale are expected from the new centralized process together with the need to maintain an arm’s length relationship between investigative authorities and other civil aviation interests in EU countries.

According to the press release linked above,

The proposed regulation aims to create a modern regulatory framework for air accident investigation. The centrepiece of this proposal is the establishment of a European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities. It will coordinate and strengthen cooperation between the Member States, the Commission and EASA, and implement a number of central functions, such as coordinating training activities or sharing investigation resources available in the EU.

Click here to access this most interesting new (or modernized ?) concept of flying boats.

Surprising flying boat (YachtPals photo)

To be honest, this concept of flying boat caught me by surprise as I read the YachtPals article. Seaplane pilots know that, for specific purposes such as rules of collision avoidance, seaplanes are treated as aircraft when airborne and as vessels when supported by water.

The thin line between an aeronautical activity and a nautical one

There are other situations where the thin line that separates an aeronautical activity from a marine activity is barely discernible, sometimes to the point of being artificially set by rules for regulatory convenience.

Overall, it is safe to assume the flying boats referred to in the YachtPals’ article would come under the legal definition of an ultralight aircraft. Some of them might even fit in the advanced ultralight aeroplane category, meaning the pilot is allowed to carry a passenger.  Furthermore, because of their combination of fuselage and supporting hull, one might be tempted to call them ultralight amphibians except that amphibians generally have the capability of rolling on a hard surface as well, whether ice or ground.

After a little research about terminology usage, I came across a website among several others, called Introduction to Ultralights that seems to put the case to rest: “ultralight seaplanes” include “ultralight amphibians” on the one hand, and “ultralight floatplanes” together with ”ultralight flying boats”, on the other hand. The website goes on to define “ultralight flying boat” as follows:

Unlike the amphibians, these aircraft use their fuselage as a floating hull. Often they are flex wing machines and in general are cheaper than the other seaplanes. Most often they can only land on and take off from water.

Back to our main topic, you will notice on the video at the bottom of the Yachtpals web page linked to above under “Click here”, how there appears to be no wind at all nor turbulence during the demo flight. In other words, the video was shot in very favourable weather conditions. It remains to be seen how this ultra-light flying boat would perform and handle in windier conditions and, to make matters more challenging, in turbulent air.

Why raise these two potential issues? Because, ultra-light are generally best flown in smooth air and low wind conditions due to the very light wing-loading that partly defines them from a regulatory perspective.

If YachtPals published this story on their site, they most likely consider this contraption as a boat with wings (see the title YachtPals used: “Dinghies with Wingies”), something that makes total sense from a non-regulatory perspective. Consequently, the definition quoted above would be biased toward boating and read:

Unlike the amphibians, these aircraft use their floating hull as a fuselage. (…)

In other words, the article emphasises an amazing alternative use of inflatable dinghies. Now, what will they find next with the arsenal of floating devices that can also take to the air in a very enjoyable way?

The encouraging part of this concept is that the whole contraption looks fairly simple. It’s basically a powered hang-glider properly affixed to an inflatable dinghy, a stock dinghy by the looks of it.  As a result, the cost of owning and flying such a seaplane could in fact be quite reasonable.

I’ve never flown any of these ultralight flying boats. However, I suspect drag and weight to be higher than in the case of an ultra-light amphibian or floatplane of similar size. The combined hull/fuselage component of these ingenious flying machines is streamlined for water use (in the case of a stock inflatable dinghy) but not for flying.

Fortunately, recent models of Rotax engines, for example, provide a power-to-weight ratio sufficient to overcome higher induced drag in critical stages of flight, namely take-off run, climb rate, spread between stall speed and cruise speed, as well as quick go-around capability following a balked approach to land. In other words, though I do not know the actual performance specs of this flying boat, it would seem that its flight envelope is tight.

As for engine-out situations in flight, I’d sure want to know the ultralight’s gliding characteristics. Something tells me that staying close to a safe body of water for landing is the best way to operate this contraption without having to worry about engine problems.

The inflatable dinghy-mounted ultralight is a marvel of creativity, no doubt. However, I have misgiving about adapting the lift components of an aircraft to a main structure that was not meant to be used for flying purposes. In aircraft design terms, it’s sort of putting the cart before the ox. Other than the convenience of being able to take off and land on water using an affordable flotation device, flying performance must be less than ideal, I would imagine. This is perhaps why certain countries, as noted in the YachtPals article, have banned this type of ultralight flying boat.

Such personal misgivings, however, warrant further inquiry, as I do not wish to knock down a potentially good match between boat design and aircraft design, based on incomplete information.

As for the safety record of ultralight flying boats, we’ll most likely have to wait for reliable statistics to be made public.

Having said this, the photos and the video of the ultralight flying boat are compelling to the point where the wide-eyed kid in me secretly dreams of flying the aircraft in calm air, over charming lake-dotted terrain. After all, why would I be blogging about an attention-grabbing flying dinghy ?

PS: Modern flying boats, whether conventional or not, are still being designed and produced. Pictures of such flying boats can be seen here, although the website posting these pictures makes no distinction between a flying boat as such and an amphibian. Instead, it introduces other Canadian and U.S. distinctions or categories presently in use.

Oh, “le grand Charles” would not be pleased at all about this news item if he were still around! He would surely use some of his famous public statements in an attempt to correct CDG Airport’s faltering image, such as: « Vive l’aéroport CDG libre de tout défaut ! » or « Passagers de tous pays, oui, je vous ai compris ! ».  Hmmm… need I translate posthumous statements of such historical significance?   

However, there is no need for alarm here, I believe, regarding CDG airport because what that website says really is that Paris, as a major world destination and the prestigious capital of France, deserves a higher level of service at its main international airport.

The “Guide to Sleeping in Airports” website is by no means scientific. It basically goes along with user reviews.

Whether or not French people are getting a bang for their tax-dollar (keeping in mind that the Aéroports de Paris management group has been privatised in 2005), and airline passengers for the airport user fee, might warrant deeper public debate or study.

It does seem that CDG airport authorities, Aéroports de Paris, might take notice of issues raised in the passenger reviews in order to make significant and yet inexpensive improvements for the benefit of CDG airport users. 

There are cultural factors involved here that are worth mentioning, some of which I have observed myself over the years. I have travelled through France on numerous occasions, sometimes using major airports, mostly driving through by car. I have had very few unpleasant encounters outside Paris. On the contrary, I was consistently charmed by French hospitality in the countryside and smaller cities.

Paris, is another story, with all due respect for “la Ville-Lumière”.  I’ve had minor mishaps with local folks in hotels, restaurants, banks, on the streets and in airports in Paris. Nevertheless, I would go back there anytime, given the right opportunity. Parisians are great people. However, there is a significant proportion of employees – whether from Paris or not – unhappy with their jobs, so it would seem, and they perhaps take it out on travellers and tourists. Some mishaps turned up to be quite funny, and as a visitor’s reward is to go back home with a delightful yarn to spin about a short stay in Paris. 

Not all passenger reviews about CDG Airport will take local culture into account. In other words, there are ways in which Parisians do their job that, say, adds colour to experiencing Paris.

Sticking to civil aviation topics, in 1985, I missed my Orly to Montreal (Mirabel) flight because my return ticket showed my airplane leaving at 7:30.  I took it to mean 7:00 pm, not 7:00 am. When I showed up at the airline check-in counter (the now defunct Nationair charter company), the company rep just laughed saying out loud how stupid a mistake I made and pointed out that my return ticket was now void. No other information was provided; this person had to close her check-in counter right there and then.

Well, I can think of kinder ways of dealing with ‘stupid’ passengers such as myself. I felt briefly both shocked and stranded. My well-wishers had already gone back home by car hundreds of kilometres away. Not a pleasant experience, although three days later I was back home in Canada thanks to a very pleasant Air France flight out of CDG booked by a helpful and compassionate travel agent at a rock-bottom fare.

I have crossed the North Atlantic dozens of times and up until then, and never had a Canada-bound airliner leave that early in the morning. But Nationair was a charter airline. Gate slot assignments are different for charter airlines. Was I supposed to know that fact? Maybe so, given the nature of my profession.

Meanwhile back in Ottawa, my employer at the time, Transport Canada – Civil Aviation, thought I had quit my job because I failed to return to my desk on the due date. When you are on holidays abroad, the last think that comes to mind are government rules on deemed abandonment of position in the federal Public Service. Another lesson learned.

Well, now I can laugh about the whole experience. I did not lose my job but had some explaining to do. What I am not laughing about so much is the fact that more than 20 years later, many Parisians employed to serve tourists and passengers are just as bold with foreigners as ever before. Yesterday, the “Le Monde” newspaper ran an article noting that fewer and fewer recent French high-school graduates are able to converse in English.

Public education, local culture, airport service levels… it all ties in together. Where does one start fixing the problem? Or, is the problem that serious? It could very well be that only airport users with negative experiences make their voices heard. Happy airport users simply go unnoticed.

Do you know where the sweetest airport P.A. voice originated from? Orly airport, in Paris. People call it “la voix d’Orly”. It’s charming and relaxing, and makes going through airports so much more pleasant and conceivably allays the fear of flying for some.

For example, given the choice, which destination would you prefer Sydney, Australia, or Sydney, Canada?

Both can be considered as a paradise in their own right. The first city is large and world renowned. The second city is way smaller but so close to the famous Cabot Trail, alas with no glamorous Opera House nearby.

A moot point, a matter of taste…? Wait, hold your fire!  This is no laughing matter at all for a pair of flying Dutchmen who were heading for Sydney, Australia, and who, through some mix-up, ended up in the other Sydney.

Here is the story of international flight paths gone astray and of the aggravation two air travellers from the same family had to face: http://www.capebretonpost.com/index.cfm?sid=276332&sc=145.

Bluenosers are sorry for their much delayed arrival to their intended destination in Sidney, Australia. However, they do hope to see the grandfather/grandson pair from Holland come back to our Sidney in the future to enjoy the Cape Breton area, especially the Cabot Trail.

PS: You know what’s more about such air travel incidents? It has happened, in a similar way, to aircraft pilots too, i.e.: incidents involving mistaken runways or mistaken neighbouring airports (not diametrically opposed airports, to my knowledge). Whether or not such pilots are still pilots remains a mystery. Now, I won’t mention how often airline luggage ends up in the wrong place.

The 2009 study titled “Key Results of the 2009 ATRS Global Airport
Performance Benchmarking Project” covers 142 airports and 16 airport groups spread over the U.S. and Canada, Europe, Asia, Australia and New Zeeland. The study is ongoing, as the author, Prof. Tae Oum, of the University of British Columbia, and president of ATRS, is seeking additional data from benevolent and reliable sources to include more airports.

In 2009, as far as large* international airports are concerned, the following airports received an award for their efficiency in three categories:

1) Global Airport Efficiency Excellence Award: Atlanta International
2) Europe Airport Efficiency Excellence Award: Copenhagen International
3) Asia-Pacific Airport Efficiency Excellence Award: Hong Kong International and Brisbane International

*Large airports are those that, for the statistical year 2007-2008, handled 15 million passengers or more on an annual basis. Passengers included in the statistics are both international and domestic.

The awards listed above point to overall airport management efficiency, including service levels to passengers.

The data used in selecting large airports for the ATRS 2009 awards do not explicitly take into account extraneous factors such as commuting times to and from airports, aircraft traffic noise levels in the vicinity of airports, environmental impact and other such ‘soft’ factors from an economic viewpoint.

One can only hope that other studies and awards will cast a broader net – not an easy task by all means – and include factors affecting the airports’ surrounding population.

As the ATRS annual study indicates, its focus is mainly on airport performance.

The study does mention in passing that Toronto International (Lester B. Pearson Airport) has been observed as one of the major airports charging some of the highest user fees. The study also mentions that user fees should be matched to service levels and stops short of making any value judgment about Toronto International or other airports included in its analysis. In general terms, the aim of ATRS is to foster the exchange of ideas and data, in a multi-disciplinary context, that will lead to optimum airport management and efficiency for the benefit of airport authorities, airlines and passengers.

There are a number of other organizations who post online rankings of world airports, Skytrax referred to above being one of them and airliners.net yet another popular one.  Needless to say, one should exercise caution when comparing ranking organizations with one another. The easy way to a quick answer about airports that consistently rank high is to check all of these known sources and check for results.

Hong Kong International and Madrid Barajas International keep coming up at the top of such lists, along with a number of airports that did not make it to close to the top in the ATRS study linked above.

Different methodology, different aims and different analytical resources, each and all account for sometimes widely different rankings.

What we need perhaps is a website that ranks airport ranking websites. 

Heck, there are a lot of very good international airports, big or small. Should I had brag about my nearby Halifax Stanfield International Airport? I would have every reason to. Simply remember the amazing job they did of accepting countless diverted airliners inbound to the U.S. on 9/11, on a very short notice.